Theme
Logic and argument
13 philosophers, 5 traditions
What makes an argument good, and can correct reasoning be set out in rules? Greek, Chinese, Indian, Islamic and modern European thinkers each built their own answers.
What makes an argument good, and can the rules of correct reasoning be written down? Aristotle was the first to treat them systematically. His syllogistic shows how a conclusion follows from two premises by their form alone, whatever the terms mean. The Stoic Chrysippus built a different system on the connections between whole propositions, made with words such as “if”, “or”, “and” and “not”. In China, the Mohists did not develop a formal logic: they treated reasoning as judging whether a new case is of the same kind as an accepted model.
In India, logicians asked what makes a reason a good one. Dharmakīrti required a reason to meet three conditions, linking the property cited as a reason to the thing being proved. In the Islamic world Avicenna made Aristotle’s syllogism the tool for verifying a claim, by finding the middle term that explains it. In the fourteenth century William of Ockham grounded his logic in a language of thought and a theory of what terms stand for in a sentence.
Gottlob Frege remade logic in 1879 with a notation that could analyse statements about “all” and “some”, the basis of the predicate logic still used today. Bertrand Russell found the paradox that undid Frege’s attempt to derive arithmetic from logic, and with Whitehead built a theory of types to avoid it. Logicians today recognise many kinds of logic beyond Aristotle’s, but his remains the first.
Through time
5th century BCE
Mozi
The Mohists did not develop a formal logic. They saw all reasoning as distinguishing kinds: cite a model or standard (fa), show whether a case conforms to it, and so judge whether it is “this” or “not”. Later Mohists called this “extending kinds”, treating things alike in some respects as alike in another.
4th century BCE
Aristotle
Aristotle gave the first systematic account of correct reasoning. His syllogistic shows how a conclusion follows from premises by their form alone, whatever the terms mean, and he extended it to necessity and possibility. Logic belongs to no one science: it sets out principles of good argument for every inquiry.
3rd century BCE
Chrysippus
As an alternative to Aristotle’s logic of classes, Chrysippus built a logic of propositions joined by “if”, “or”, “and” and “not”. He listed five basic forms of argument whose validity is beyond question, modus ponens among them, and hoped that every valid argument could be reduced to them.
Drew on and argued against Aristotle
About 900 years later
7th century CE
Dharmakīrti
A good reason must meet three conditions: the property cited as a reason must belong to the subject; it must be found only where the property to be proved is present; and it must be wholly absent where that property is absent. Inference, unlike perception, is conceptual thinking that proceeds by such reasons.
About 400 years later
11th century
Avicenna
Logic is the instrument of philosophy. To verify a claim that A is C, one must find a middle term B that explains the connection and build the syllogism “A is B, B is C, so A is C”, following Aristotle’s account of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics.
Drew on Aristotle
13th century
Afdal al-Din al-Khunaji
Avicenna’s logic needed revision, not reverence. Khunaji objected to its account of what a true statement must be about, and reworked its treatment of propositions, modality and conditionals, shaping logic in Arabic for centuries.
Argued against Avicenna
14th century
William of Ockham
Written language depends on spoken language, and spoken language on mental language, the language of thought. His Summa of Logic moves from terms to propositions to arguments, using a theory of supposition, what a term stands for in a sentence, to give the truth conditions of propositions.
Drew on Aristotle
About 600 years later
19th century
E. E. Constance Jones
An informative statement joins terms that differ in meaning but pick out the same thing; seeing this resolves puzzles about what statements assert.
Gottlob Frege
Frege reconceived logic by building the first predicate calculus, in his Begriffsschrift of 1879. It analysed statements about “all” and “some”, and defined proof in terms still accepted today. He believed he had reduced arithmetic to logic, until Russell’s letter showed that his system was inconsistent.
20th century
Suzuki Daisetsu
Affirmation can come through negation: a thing is truly itself by not being itself. This ‘is and is not’ logic expresses what ordinary logic cannot.
Bertrand Russell
He refined Frege’s predicate calculus, still the basis of most systems of logic, to argue that mathematics is in a significant sense reducible to logic. In 1901 he discovered the paradox of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves, and between 1903 and 1908 answered it with his theory of types.
Drew on Gottlob Frege; argued against E. E. Constance Jones
Susan Stebbing
Logic is not only for specialists: it can be turned on the language of politicians, advertisers, journalists and popular scientists, to expose bad reasoning that affects public life.
Drew on Bertrand Russell
Ruth Barcan Marcus
Modal logic, the logic of necessity and possibility, can be formalised rigorously with quantifiers, against Quine’s doubts, and the result underpins a legitimate metaphysics of modality.
Drew on Bertrand Russell
Terms on this page
- fa
- Standards, models or law (法). The Mohists sought objective standards for judging right and wrong; the fa thinkers, often called Legalists, sought impartial standards of rule, enforced by rewards and punishments.
Sources
- Susanne Bobzien, Ancient Logic, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Brendan Gillon, Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy